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Abstract
Continually arriving information is communicated through a network of n agents, with
the value of information to the j’th recipient being a decreasing function of j/n, and commu-
nication costs paid by recipient. Regardless of details of network and communication costs,
the social optimum policy is to communicate arbitrarily slowly. But selfish agent behavior
leads to Nash equilibria which (in the n → ∞ limit) may be efficient (Nash payoff = social
optimum payoff) or wasteful (0 < Nash payoff < social optimum payoff) or totally wasteful
(Nash payoff = 0). We study the cases of the complete network (constant communication
costs between all agents), the grid with only nearest-neighbor communication, and the grid
with communication cost a function of distance. The main technical tool is analysis of the
associated first passage percolation process or SI epidemic (representing spread of one item
of information) and in particular its “window width”, the time interval during which most
agents learn the item.
Many arguments are just outlined, not intended as complete rigorous proofs. This version
was written in July 2007 to accompany a talk at the ICTP workshop “Common Concepts in
Statistical Physics and Computer Science”, and intended as a starting point for future thesis
projects which could explore these and many variant problems in detail. One of the topics
herein (first passage percolation on the N ×N torus with short and long range interactions;
section 6.2) has now been studied rigorously by Chatterjee and Durrett [4], and so it seems
appropriate to make this version publicly accessible.
∗Research supported by N.S.F. Grant DMS0704159
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1 Introduction
A topic which one might loosely call “random percolation of information through networks” arises
in many different contexts, from epidemic models [2] and computer virus models [10] to gossip
algorithms [8] designed to keep nodes of a decentralized network updated about information
needed to maintain the network. This topic differs from communication networks in that we
envisage information as having a definite source but no definite destination.
In this paper we study an aspect where the vertices of the network are agents, and where there
are costs and benefits associated with the different choices that agents may make in communi-
cating information. In such “economic game theory” settings one anticipates a social optimum
strategy that maximizes the total net payoff to all agents combined, and an (often different) Nash
equilibrium characterized by the property that no one agent can benefit from deviating from the
Nash equilibrium strategy followed by all other agents (so one anticipates that any reasonable
process of agents adjusting strategies in a selfish way will lead to some Nash equilibrium). Of
course a huge number of different models of costs, benefits and choices could fit the description
above, but we focus on the specific setting where the value to you of receiving information de-
pends on how few people know the information before you do. Two familiar real world examples
are gossip in social networks and insider trading in financial markets. In the first, the gossiper
gains perceived social status from transmitting information, and so is implicitly willing to pay for
communicate to others; in the second the owner of knowledge recognizes its value and implictly
expects to be paid for communication onwards. Our basic model makes the simpler assump-
tion that the value to an agent attaches at the time information is received, and subsequently
the agent takes no initiative to communicate it to others, but does so freely when requested,
with the requester paying the cost of communication. In our model the benefits come from, and
communication costs are paid to, the outside world: there are no payments between agents.
Remark. Many arguments are just outlined, not intended as complete rigorous proofs. This
version was written in July 2007, and intended as a starting point for future thesis projects which
could explore these and many variant problems in detail. One of the topics herein (first passage
percolation on the N ×N torus with short and long range interactions; section 6.2) has now been
studied rigorously by Chatterjee and Durrett [4], and so it seems appropriate to make this version
publicly accessible.
1.1 The general framework: a rank-based reward game
There are n agents (our results are in the n→∞ limit). The basic two rules are:
Rule 1. New items of information arrive at times of a rate-1 Poisson process; each item comes
to one random agent.
Information spreads between agents by virtue of one agent calling another and learning all
items that the other knows (details are case-specific, described later), with a (case-specific) com-
munication cost paid by the receiver of information.
Rule 2. The j’th person to learn an item of information gets reward R( jn).
Here R(u), 0 < u ≤ 1 is a function such that
R(u) is decreasing; R(1) = 0; 0 < R¯ :=
∫ 1
0
R(u)du <∞. (1)
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Assuming information eventually reaches each agent, the total reward from each item will be∑n
j=1R(
j
n) ∼ nR¯. If agents behave in some “exchangeable” way then the average net payoff (per
agent per unit time) is
payoff = R¯− (average communication cost per agent per unit time). (2)
Now the average communication cost per unit time can be made arbitrarily small by simply
communicating less often (because an agent learns all items that another agent knows, for the
cost of one call. Note the calling agent does not know in advance whether the other agent has any
new items of information). Thus the “social optimum” protocol is to communicate arbitrarily
slowly, giving payoff arbitrarily close to R¯. But if agents behave selfishly then one agent may
gain an advantage by paying to obtain information more quickly, and so we seek to study Nash
equilibria for selfish agents. In particular there are three qualitative different possibilities. In the
n→∞ limit, the Nash equilibrium may be
• efficient (Nash payoff = social optimum payoff)
• or wasteful (0 < Nash payoff < social optimum payoff)
• or totally wasteful (Nash payoff = 0).
1.2 Methodology
Allowing agents’ behaviors to be completely general makes the problems rather complicated (e.g.
a subset of agents could seek to coordinate their actions) so in each specific model we restrict
agent behavior to be of a specified form, making calls at random times with a rate parameter θ;
the agent’s “strategy” is just a choice of θ, and for this discussion we assume θ is a single real
number. If all agents use the same parameter value θ then the spread of one item of information
through the network is as some model-dependent first passage percolation process (see section
2.2). So there is some function Fθ,n(t) giving the proportion of agents who learn the item within
time t after the arrival of the information into the network. Now suppose one agent ego uses
a different parameter value φ and gets some payoff-per-unit-time, denoted by payoff(φ, θ). The
Nash equilibrium value θNash is the value of θ for which ego cannot do better by choosing a
different value of φ, and hence is the solution of
d
dφ
payoff(φ, θ)
∣∣∣∣
φ=θ
= 0. (3)
Obtaining a formula for payoff(φ, θ) requires knowing Fθ,n(t) and knowing something about the
geometry of the sets of informed agents at time t – see (19,26) for the two basic examples. The
important point is that where we know the exact n → ∞ limit behavior of Fθ,n(t) we get a
formula for the exact limit θNash, and where we know order of magnitude behavior of Fθ,n(t) we
get order of magnitude behavior of θNash.
Note that we have assumed that in a Nash equilibrium each agent uses the same strategy.
This is only a sensible assumption when the network cost structure has enough symmetry (is
transitive – see section 7.1) and the non-transitive case is an interesting topic for future study.
It turns out (section 4) that for determining the qualitative behavior of the Nash equilibria,
the important aspect is the size of the window width wθ,n of the associated first passage perco-
lation process, that is the time interval over which the proportion of agents knowing the item
of information increases from (say) 10% to 90%. While this is well understood in the simplest
examples of first passage percolation on finite sets, it has not been studied for very general models
and our game-theoretic questions provide motivation for future such study.
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To interpret later formulas it turns out to be convenient to work with the derivative of R.
Write R′(u) = −r(u), so that R(u) =
∫ 1
u r(s)ds and (1) becomes
r(u) ≥ 0; 0 < R¯ :=
∫ 1
0
ur(u)du <∞. (4)
1.3 Summary of results
1.3.1 The complete graph case
Network communication model: Each agent i may, at any time, call any other agent j (at
cost 1), and learn all items that j knows.
Poisson strategy. The allowed strategy for an agent i is to place calls, at the times of a Poisson
(rate θ) process, to a random agent.
Result (section 2). In the n→∞ limit the Nash equilibrium value of θ is
θNash =
∫ 1
0
(1 + log(1− u))R(u)du =
∫ 1
0
r(u)g(u)du (5)
where g(u) = −(1− u) log(1− u) > 0.
Our assumptions (1) on R(u) imply 0 < θNash < R¯. Because an agent’s average cost per unit
time equals his value of θ, from (2) the Nash equilibrium payoff R¯− θNash is strictly less than the
social optimum payoff R¯ but strictly greater than 0. So this is a “wasteful” case.
1.3.2 The nearest neighbor grid
Network communication model: Agents are at the vertices of the N ×N torus (i.e. the grid
with periodic boundary conditions). Each agent i may, at any time, call any of the 4 neighboring
agents j (at cost 1), and learn all items that j knows.
Poisson strategy. The allowed strategy for an agent i is to place calls, at the times of a Poisson
(rate θ) process, to a random neighboring agent.
Result (section 3). The Nash equilibrium value of θ is such that as N →∞
θNashN ∼ N
−1
∫ 1
0
g(u)r(u)du (6)
where g(u) > 0 is a certain complicated function – see (28).
So here the Nash equilibrium payoff R¯− θNashN tends to R¯; this is an “efficient” case.
1.3.3 Grid with communication costs increasing with distance
Network communication model. The agents are at the vertices of the N × N torus. Each
agent i may, at any time, call any other agent j, at cost c(N, d(i, j)), and learn all items that j
knows.
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Here d(i, j) is the distance between i and j. We treat two cases, with different choices of
c(N, d). In section 5 we take cost function c(N, d) = c(d) satisfying
c(1) = 1; c(d) ↑ ∞ as d→∞ (7)
and
Poisson strategy. An agent’s strategy is described by a sequence (θ(d); d = 1, 2, 3, . . .); where
for each d:
at rate θ(d) the agent calls a random agent at distance d.
In this case a simple abstract argument (section 5) shows that the Nash equilibrium is efficient
(without calculating what the equilibrium strategy or payoff actually is) for any c(d) satisfying
(7).
In section 6 we take
c(N, d) = 1; d = 1
= cN ; d > 1
where 1≪ cN ≪ N
3, and
Poisson strategy. An agent’s strategy is described by a pair of numbers (θnear, θfar) = θ:
at rate θnear the agent calls a random neighbor
at rate θfar the agent calls a random non-neighbor.
In this case we show (42) that the Nash equilibrium strategy satisfies
θNashnear ∼ ζ1c
−1/2
N ; θ
Nash
far ∼ ζ2c
−2
N
for certain constants ζ1, ζ2 depending on the reward function. So the Nash equilibrium cost
∼ ζ1c
−1/2
N , implying that the equilibrium is efficient.
1.3.4 Plan of paper
The two basic cases (complete graph, nearest-neighbor grid) can be analyzed directly using known
results for first passage percolation on these structures; we do this analysis in sections 2 and 3.
There are of course simple arguments for order-of-magnitude behavior in those cases, which we
recall in section 4 (but which the reader may prefer to consult first) as a preliminary to the more
complicated model “grid with communication costs increasing with distance”, for which one needs
to understand orders of magnitude before embarking on calculations.
1.4 Variant models and questions
These results suggest many alternate questions and models, a few of which are addressed briefly
in the sections indicated, the others providing suggestions for future research.
• Are there cases where the Nash equilibrium is totally wasteful? (section 2.1)
• Wouldn’t it be better to place calls at regular time intervals? (section 7.2)
• Can one analyze more general strategies?
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• In the grid context of section 1.3.3, what is the equilibrium strategy and cost for more
general costs c(N, d)?
• What about the symmetric model where, when i calls j, they exchange information? (sec-
tion 7.1)
• In formulas (5,6) we see decoupling between the reward function r(u) and the function g(u)
involving the rest of the model – is this a general phenomenon?
• In the nearest-neighbor grid case, wouldn’t it be better to cycle calls through the 4 neigh-
bors?
• What about non-transitive models, e.g. social networks where different agents have different
numbers of friends, so that different agents have different strategies in the Nash equilibrium?
• To model gossip, wouldn’t it be better to make the reward to agent i depend on the number
of other agents who learn the item from agent i? (section 7.3)
• To model insider trading, wouldn’t it be better to say that agent j is willing to pay some
amount s(t) to agent i for information that i has possessed for time t, the function s(·) not
specified in advance but a component of strategy and hence with a Nash equilibrium value?
1.5 Conclusions
As the list above suggests, we are only scratching the surface of a potentially large topic. In the
usual setting of information communication networks, the goal is to communicate quickly, and
our two basic examples (complete graph; nearest-neighbor grid) are the extremes of rapid and
slow communication. It is therefore paradoxical that, in our rank-based reward game, the latter is
efficient while the former is inefficient. One might jump to the conclusion that in general efficiency
in the rank-based reward game was inversely related to network connectivity. But the examples
of the grid with long-range interaction show the situation is not so simple, in that agents could
choose to make long range calls and emulate a highly-connected network, but in equilibrium they
do not do so very often.
2 The complete graph
The default assumptions in this section are
Network communication model: Each agent i may, at any time, call any other agent j (at
cost 1), and learn all items that j knows.
Poisson strategy. The allowed strategy for an agent i is to place calls, at the times of a Poisson
(rate θ) process, to a random agent.
2.1 Finite number of rewards
Before deriving the result (5) in our general framework, let us step outside that framework
to derive a very easy variant result. Suppose that only the first two recipients of an item of
information receive a reward, of amount wn say. Agent strategy cannot affect the first recipient,
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only the second. Suppose ego uses rate φ and other agents use rate θ. Then (by elementary
properties of Exponential distributions)
P (ego is second to receive item) =
φ
φ+ (n− 2)θ
(8)
and so
payoff(φ, θ) =
wn
n
+
φwn
φ+ (n− 2)θ
− φ.
We calculate
d
dφ
payoff(φ, θ) =
(n − 2)θwn
(φ+ (n − 2)θ)2
− 1
and then the criterion (3) gives
θNashn =
(n− 2)wn
(n − 1)2
∼
wn
n
.
To compare this variant with the general framework, we want the total reward available from an
item to equal n, to make the social optimum payoff → 1, so we choose wn = n/2. So we have
shown that the Nash equilibrium payoff is
payoff = 1− θNashn →
1
2 . (9)
So this is a “wasteful” case.
By the same argument we can study the case where (for fixed k ≥ 2) the first k recipients get
reward n/k. In this case we find
θNashn ∼
k − 1
k
and the Nash equilibrium payoff is
payoff → 1k (10)
while the social optimum payoff = 1. Thus by taking kn →∞ slowly we have a model in which
the Nash equilibrium is “totally wasteful”.
2.2 First passage percolation : general setup
The classical setting for first passage percolation, surveyed in [11], concerns nearest neighbor
percolation on the d-dimensional lattice. Let us briefly state our general setup for first passage
percolation (of “information”) on a finite graph. There are “rate” parameters νij ≥ 0 for undi-
rected edges (i, j). There is an initial vertex v0, which receives the information at time 0. At
time t, for each vertex i which has already received the information, and each neighbor j, there
is chance νijdt that j learns the information from i before time t+ dt. Equivalently, create inde-
pendent Exponential(νij) random variables Vij on edges (i, j). Then each vertex v receives the
information at time
Tv = min{Vi0i1 + Vi1i2 + . . .+ Vik−1ik}
minimized over paths v0 = i0, i1, i2, . . . , ik = v.
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2.3 First passage percolation on the complete graph
Consider first passage percolation on the complete n-vertex graph with rates νij = 1/(n − 1).
Pick k random agents and write S¯n(1), . . . , S¯
n
(k) for the times at which these k agents receive the
information. The key fact for our purposes is that as n→∞
(S¯n(1) − log n, . . . , S¯
n
(k) − log n)
d
→ (ξ + S(1), . . . , ξ + S(k)) (11)
where the limit variables are independent, ξ has double exponential distribution P (ξ ≤ x) =
exp(−e−x) and each S(i) has the logistic distribution with distribution function
F1(x) =
ex
1 + ex
, −∞ < x <∞. (12)
Here
d
→ denotes convergence in distribution. To outline a derivation of (11), fix a large integer
L and decompose the percolation times as
S¯n(i) − log n = (τL − logL) + (S¯
n
(i) − τL + log(L/n)) (13)
where τL is the time at which some L agents have received the information. By the Yule process
approximation (see e.g. [1]) to the fixed-time behavior of the first passage percolation, the number
N(t) of agents possessing the information at fixed large time t is approximately distributed as
Wet, where W has Exponential(1) distribution, and so
P (τL ≤ t) = P (N(t) ≥ L) ≈ P (We
t ≥ L) = exp(−Le−t)
implying τL − logL ≈ ξ in distribution, explaining the first summand on the right side of (11).
Now consider the proportion H(t) of agents possessing the information at time τL + t. This
proportion follows closely the deterministic logistic equation H ′ = H(1 − H) whose solution
is (12) shifted to satisfy the initial condition H(0) = L/n, so this solution approximates the
distribution function of S(i)− log(L/n). Thus the time S¯
n
(i) at which a random agent receives the
information satisfies
(S¯n(i) − τL + log(L/n)) ≈ S(i) in distribution
independently as i varies. Now the limit decomposition (11) follow from the finite-n decomposition
(13)..
We emphasize (11) instead of more elementary derivations (using methods of [9, 13]) of the
limit distribution for S¯n(1)− log n because (11) gives the correct dependence structure for different
agents. Because only relative order of gaining information is relevant to us, we may recenter by
subtracting ξ and suppose that the times at which different random agents gain information are
independent with logistic distribution (12).
2.4 Analysis of the rank-based reward game
We now return to our general reward framework
The j’th person to learn an item of information gets reward R( jn)
and give the argument for (5).
Suppose all agents use the Poisson(θ) strategy. In the case θ = 1, the way that a single item
of information spreads is exactly as the first passage percolation process above; and the general-θ
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case is just a time-scaling by θ. So as above, we may suppose that (all calculations in the n→∞
limit) the recentered time Sθ to reach a random agent has distribution function
Fθ(x) = F1(θx) (14)
which is the solution of the time-scaled logistic equation
F ′θ
1− Fθ
= θFθ (15)
(Recall F1 is the logistic distribution (12)). Now consider the case where all other agents use a
value θ but ego uses a different value φ. The (limit, recentered) time Tφ,θ at which ego learns
the information now has distribution function Gφ,θ satisfying an analog of (15):
G′φ,θ
1−Gφ,θ
= φFθ. (16)
To explain this equation, the left side is the rate at time t at which ego learns the information;
this equals the rate φ of calls by ego, times the probability Fθ(t) that the called agent has received
the information. To solve the equation, first we get
1−Gφ,θ = exp
(
−φ
∫
Fθ
)
.
But we know that in the case φ = θ the solution is Fθ, that is we know
1− Fθ = exp
(
−θ
∫
Fθ
)
,
and so we have the solution of (16) in the form
1−Gφ,θ = (1− Fθ)
φ/θ. (17)
If ego gets the information at time t then his percentile rank is Fθ(t) and his reward is R(Fθ(t)).
So the expected reward to ego is
ER(Fθ(Tφ,θ)); where dist(Tφ,θ) = Gφ,θ.
We calculate
P (Fθ(Tφ,θ) ≤ u) = Gφ,θ(F
−1
θ (u))
= 1− (1− Fθ(F
−1
θ (u)))
φ/θ by (17)
= 1− (1− u)φ/θ (18)
and so
ER(Fθ(Tφ,θ)) =
∫ 1
0
r(u) (1− (1− u)φ/θ)du.
This is the mean reward to ego from one item, and hence also the mean reward per unit time in
the ongoing process. So, including the “communication cost” of φ per unit time, the net payoff
(per unit time) to ego is
payoff(φ, θ) = −φ+
∫ 1
0
r(u) (1− (1− u)φ/θ)du. (19)
The criterion (3) for θ to be a Nash equilibrium is, using the fact ddφx
φ/θ = log xθ x
φ/θ,
1 = 1θ
∫ 1
0
r(u) (− log(1− u)) (1− u)du. (20)
This is the second equality in (5), and integrating by parts gives the first equality.
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Remark. For the linear reward function
R(u) = 2(1 − u); R¯ = 1
result (5) gives Nash payoff = 1/2. Consider alternatively
R(u) = 1u0 1(u≤u0); R¯ = 1.
Then the n→∞ Nash equilibrium cost is
θNash(u0) =
1
u0
∫ u0
0
(1 + log(1− u)) du.
In particular, the Nash payoff 1− θNash(u0) satisfies
1− θNash(u0)→ 0 as u0 → 0.
In words, as the reward becomes concentrated on a smaller and smaller proportion of the pop-
ulation then the Nash equilibrium becomes more and more wasteful. In this sense result (5) in
the general framework is consistent with the “finite number of rewards” result (10).
3 The N ×N torus, nearest neighbor case
Network communication model. There are N2 agents at the vertices of the N × N torus.
Each agent i may, at any time, call any of the 4 neighboring agents j (at cost 1), and learn all
items that j knows.
Poisson strategy. The allowed strategy for an agent i is to place calls, at the times of a Poisson
(rate θ) process, to a random neighboring agent.
We will derive formula (6). As remarked later, the function g(u) is ultimately derived from
fine structure of first passage percolation in the plane, and seems impossible to determine as an
explicit formula. But of course the main point is that (in contrast to the complete graph case)
the Nash equilibrium payoff R¯− θNashN = R¯−O(N
−1) tends to the social optimum R¯.
3.1 Nearest-neighbor first passage percolation on the torus
Consider (nearest-neighbor) first passage percolation on the N × N torus, started at a uniform
random vertex, with rates νij = 1 for edges (i, j). Write (T
N
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) for the information
receipt times of the 4 neighbors of the origin (using paths not through the origin), and write
QN (t) for the number of vertices informed by time t. Write TN∗ = min(T
N
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4).
The key point is that we expect a N →∞ limit of the following form
(TNi − T
N
∗ , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4; N
−2QN (TN∗ ); (N
−1(QN (TN∗ + t)−Q
N (TN∗ )), 0 ≤ t <∞))
d
→ (τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4; U ; (V t, 0 ≤ t <∞)) (21)
where τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 are nonnegative with mini τi = 0; U has uniform(0, 1) distribution; 0 < V <
∞; with a certain complicated joint distribution for these limit quantities.
To explain (21), first note that as N →∞ the differences TNi −T
N
∗ are stochastically bounded
(by the time to percolate through a finite set of edges) but cannot converge to 0 (by linearity of
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growth rate in the shape theorem below), so we expect some non-degenerate limit distribution
(τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4). Next consider the time T
N
0 at which the origin is wetted. By uniformity of
starting position, QN (TN0 ) must have uniform distribution on {1, 2, . . . , N
2}, and it follows that
N−2QN (TN∗ )
d
→ U . The final assertion
(N−1(QN (TN∗ + t)−Q
N (TN∗ )), 0 ≤ t <∞)
d
→ (V t, 0 ≤ t <∞) (22)
is related to the shape theorem [11] for first-pasage percolation on the infinite lattice started at
the origin. This says that the random set Bs of vertices wetted before time s grows linearly with
s, and the spatially rescaled set s−1Bs converges to a limit deterministic convex set B:
s−1Bs → B. (23)
It follows that
N−2QN (sN)→ q(s) as N →∞
where q(s) is the area of sB regarded as a subset of the continuous torus [0, 1]2. Because
N−2QN (TN0 )
d
→ U we have
TN∗ ≈ T
N
0 ≈ N
2q−1(U)
where q−1(·) is the inverse function of q(·). Writing Q′N (·) for a suitably-interpreted local growth
rate of QN (·) we deduce
(N−2QN (TN∗ ), N
−1Q′N (TN∗ ))
d
→ (U, q′(q−1(U)))
and so (22) holds for V = q′(q−1(U)).
3.2 Analysis of the rank-based reward game
We want to study the case where other agents call some neighbor at rate θ but ego (at the origin)
calls some neighbor at rate φ. To analyze rewards, by scaling time we can reduce to the case
where other agents call each neighbor at rate 1 and ego calls each neighbor at rate λ = φ/θ.
We want to compare the rank MNλ of ego (rank = j if ego is the j’th person to receive the
information) with the rank MN1 of ego in the λ = 1 case. As noted above, M
N
1 is uniform on
{1, 2, . . . , N2}. Writing (ξλi , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) for independent Exponential(λ) r.v.’s, the time at which
the origin receives the information is
TN∗ +min
i
(TNi − T
N
∗ + ξ
λ
i )
and the rank of the origin is
MNλ = Q
N (TN∗ ) +NQ˜
N (min
i
(TNi − T
N
∗ + ξ
λ
i ))
where
Q˜N (t) = N−1(QN (TN∗ + t)−Q
N (TN∗ )).
Note we can construct (ξλi , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) as (λ
−1ξ1i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4). Now use (22) to see that as N →∞
(N−2MN1 , N
−1(MNλ −M
N
1 ))
d
→ (U, V Z(λ)) (24)
where
Z(λ) := min
i
(τi + ξ
λ
i )−min
i
(τi + ξ
1
i ). (25)
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Now in the setting where ego calls at rate φ and others at rate θ we have
payoff(φ, θ)− payoff(θ, θ) + (φ− θ) = E
[
R
(
MNφ/θ
N2
)
−R
(
MN1
N2
)]
and it is straightforward to use (24) to show this
∼ N−1
∫ 1
0
(−r(u)) zu(φ/θ)du, for zu(λ) := E(V Z(λ)|U = u). (26)
The Nash equilibrium condition
d
dφ
payoff(φ, θ)
∣∣∣∣
φ=θ
= 0
now implies
θNashN ∼ N
−1
∫ 1
0
(−r(u)) z′u(1)du. (27)
Because Z(λ) is decreasing in λ we have z′u(1) < 0 and this expression is of the form (6) with
g(u) = −z′u(1) = −
d
dλ E(V Z(λ)|U = u)|λ=1 (28)
Remark. The distribution of V depends on the function q(·) which depends on the limit shape
in nearest neighbor first passage percolation, which is not explicitly known. Also Z(λ) involves
the joint distribution of (τi), which is not explicitly known, and also is (presumably) correlated
with the direction from the percolation source which is in turn not independent of V . This
suggests it would be difficult to find an explicit formula for g(u).
4 Order of magnitude arguments
Here we mention simple order of magnitude arguments for the two basic cases we have already
analyzed. As mentioned in the introduction, what matters is the size of the window width wθ,n of
the associated first passage percolation process We will re-use such arguments in sections 5 and
6.1, in more complicated settings.
Complete graph. If agents call at rate θ = 1 then by (11) the window width is order 1; so
if θn is the Nash equilibrium rate then the window width wn is order 1/θn. Suppose wn → ∞.
Then ego could call at some fixed slow rate φ and (because this implies many calls are made near
the start of the window) the reward to ego will tend to R(0), and ego’s payoff R(0) − φ will be
larger than the typical payoff R¯− θn. This contradicts the definition of Nash equilibrium. So in
fact we must have wn bounded above, implying θn bounded below, implying the Nash equilbrium
in wasteful.
Nearest neighbor torus. If agents call at rate θ = 1 then by the shape theorem (23) the
window width is order N . The time difference between receipt time for different neighbors of ego
is order 1, so if ego calls at rate 2 instead of rate 1 his rank (and hence his reward) increases
by order 1/N . By scaling, if the Nash equilibrium rate is θN and ego calls at rate 2θN then his
increased reward is again of order 1/N . His increased cost is θN . At the Nash equilibrium the
increased reward and cost must balance, so θN is order 1/N , so the Nash equilibrium is efficient.
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5 The N ×N torus with general interactions: a simple criterion
for efficiency
Network communication model. The agents are at the vertices of the N × N torus. Each
agent i may, at any time, call any other agent j, at cost c(d(i, j)), and learn all items that j
knows.
Here d(i, j) is the distance between i and j, and we assume the cost function c(d) satisfies
c(1) = 1; c(d) ↑ ∞ as d→∞. (29)
Poisson strategy. An agent’s strategy is described by a sequence (θ(d); d = 1, 2, 3, . . .); and for
each d:
at rate θ(d) the agent calls a random agent at distance d.
A simple argument below shows
under condition (29) the Nash equilibrium is efficient. (30)
Consider the Nash strategy, and suppose first that the window width wN converges to a limit
w∞ <∞. Consider a distance d such that the Nash strategy has θ
Nash(d) > 0. Suppose ego uses
θ(d) = θNash(d) + φ. The increased cost is φc(d) while the increased benefit is at most O(w∞φ),
because this is the increased chance of getting information earlier. So the Nash strategy must
have θNash(d) = 0 for sufficiently large d, not depending on N . But for first passage percolation
with bounded range transitions, the shape theorem (23) remains true and implies that wN scales
as N .
This contradiction implies that the window width wN →∞. Now suppose the Nash equilib-
rium were inefficient, with some Nash cost θ¯ > 0. Suppose ego adopts the strategy of just calling
a random neighbor at rate φN , where φN → 0, φNwN → ∞. Then ego obtains asymptotically
the same reward R¯ as his neighbor, a typical agent. But ego’s cost is φN → 0. This is a con-
tradiction with the assumption of inefficiency. So the conclusion is that the Nash equilibrium is
efficient and wN →∞.
Remarks. Result (30) is striking. but does not tell us what the Nash equilibrium strategy and
cost actually are. It is a natural open problem to study the case of (29) with c(d) = dα. Instead
we study a simpler model in the next section.
6 The N ×N torus with short and long range interactions
Network communication model. The agents are at the vertices of the N × N torus. Each
agent i may, at any time, call any of the 4 neighboring agents j (at cost 1), or call any other
agent j at cost cN ≥ 1, and learn all items that j knows.
Poisson strategy. An agent’s strategy is described by a pair of numbers (θnear, θfar) = θ:
at rate θnear the agent calls a random neighbor
at rate θfar the agent calls a random non-neighbor.
This model obviously interpolates between the complete graph model (cN = 1) and the
nearest-neighbor model (cN =∞).
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First let us consider for which values of cN the nearest-neighbor Nash equilibrium (θnear is
order N−1, θfar = 0) persists in the current setting. When ego considers using a non-zero
value of θfar, the cost is order cNθfar. The time for information to reach a typical vertex is order
N/θnear = N
2, and so the benefit of using a non-zero value of θfar is order θfarN
2. We deduce that
if cN ≫ N
2 then the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically the same as in the nearest-neighbor
case; in particular, the Nash equilibrum is efficient.
Let us study the more interesting case
1≪ cN ≪ N
2.
The result in this case turns out to be, qualitatively
θNashnear is order c
−1/2
N and θ
Nash
far is order c
−2
N . In particular, the Nash equilibrum is efficient. (31)
“Efficient” because the cost cNθfar + θnear is order c
−1/2
N . See (42) for the exact result.
We first do the order-of-magnitude calculation (section 6.1), then analyze the relevant first
passage percolation process (section 6.2), and finally do the exact analysis in section 6.3.
6.1 Order of magnitude calculation
Our order of magnitude argument for (31) uses three ingredients (32,33,34). As in section 4 we
consider the window width wN of the associated percolation process. Suppose ego deviates from
the Nash equilibrium (θNash
near
, θNash
far
) by setting his θfar = θ
Nash
far
+ δ. The chance of thereby learning
the information earlier, and hence the increased reward to ego, is order δwN and the increased
cost is δcN . At the Nash equilibrium these must balance, so
wN ≍ cN (32)
where ≍ denotes “same order of magnitude”. Now consider the difference ℓN between the times
that different neighbors of ego are wetted. Then ℓN is order 1/θ
Nash
near . Write δ = θ
Nash
near and suppose
ego deviates from the Nash equilibrium by setting his θnear = 2δ. The increased benefit to ego
is order ℓN/wN and the increased cost is δ. At the Nash equilibrium these must balance, so
δ ≍ ℓN/wN which becomes
θNashnear ≍ w
−1/2
N ≍ c
−1/2
N . (33)
Finally we need to calculate how the window width wN for FPP depends on (θnear, θfar), and we
show in the next section that
wN ≍ θ
−2/3
near θ
−1/3
far . (34)
Granted this, we substitute (32,33) to get
cN ≍ c
1/3
N θ
−1/3
far
which identifies θfar ≍ c
−2
N as stated at (31).
6.2 First passage percolation on the N × N torus with short and long range
interactions
We study the model (call it short-long FPP, to distinguish it from nearest-neighbor FPP) defined
by rates
νij =
1
4 , j a neighbor of i
= λN/N
2, j not a neighbor of i
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where 1≫ λN ≫ N
−3.
Recall the shape theorem (23) for nearest neighbor first passage percolation; let A be the area
of the limit shape B. Define an artificial distance ρ such that B is the unit ball in ρ-distance; so
nearest neighbor first passage percolation moves at asymptotic speed 1 with respect to ρ-distance.
Consider short-long FPP started at a random vertex of the N × N torus. Write FN,λN for the
proportion of vertices reached by time t and let T(0,0) be the time at which the origin is reached.
The event {T(0,0) ≤ t} corresponds asymptotically to the event that at some time t− u there is
percolation across some long edge (i, j) into some vertex j at ρ-distance ≤ u from (0, 0) (here
we use the fact that nearest neighbor first passage percolation moves at asymptotic speed 1 with
respect to ρ-distance). The rate of such events at time t− u is approximately
N2FN,λN (t− u)×Au
2 × λN/N
2
where the three terms represent the number of possible vertices i, the number of possible vertices
j, and the percolation rate νij. Since these events occur asymptotically as a Poisson process in
time, we get
1− FN,λN (t) ≈ P (T(0,0) ≤ t) ≈ exp
(
−AλN
∫ ∞
0
u2FN,λN (t− u) du
)
. (35)
This motivates study of the equation (for an unknown distribution function Fλ)
1− Fλ(t) = exp
(
−λ
∫ t
−∞
(t− s)2Fλ(s) ds
)
, −∞ < t <∞ (36)
whose solution should be unique up to centering. Writing F1 for the λ = 1 solution, the general
solution scales as
Fλ(t) := F1(λ
1/3t).
So by (35), up to centering
FN,λN (t) ≈ F1((AλN )
1/3t). (37)
To translate this result into the context of the rank-based rewards game, suppose each agent
uses strategy θN = (θN,near, θN,far). Then the spread of one item of information is as first passage
percolation with rates
νij = θN,near/4, j a neighbor of i
= θN,far/(N
2 − 5), j not a neighbor of i.
This is essentially the case above with λN = θN,far/θN,near, time-scaled by θN,near, and so by (37)
the distribution function FN,θN for the time at which a typical agent receives the information is
FN,θN (t) ≈ F1
(
A1/3θ
1/3
N,farθ
2/3
N,neart
)
. (38)
In particular the window width is as stated at (34).
6.3 Exact equations for the Nash equilibrium
The equations will involve three quantities:
(i) The solution F1 of (36).
(ii) The area A of the limit set B in the shape theorem (23) for nearest-neighbor first passage
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pecolation.
(iii) The limit distribution (cf. (21))
(T ri − T
r
∗ , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4)
d
→ (τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) as r →∞ (39)
for relative receipt times of neighbors of the origin in nearest-neighbor first passage pecolation,
where now we start the percolation at a random vertex of ρ-distance ≈ r from the origin.
To start the analysis, suppose all agents use rates θ = (θN,near, θN,far). Consider the quantities
S is the first time that ego receives the information from a non-neighbor
T is the first time that ego receives the information from a neighbor
F = FN,θN is the distribution function of T .
With probability → 1 as N → ∞ ego will actually receive the information first from a neigh-
bor, and so F is asymptotically the distribution function of the time at which ego receives the
information.
Now suppose ego uses a different rate φN,far 6= θN,far for calling a non-neighbor. This does
not affect T but changes the distribution of S to
P (S > t) ≈ exp
(
−φN,far
∫ t
−∞
F (s) ds
)
by the natural Poisson process approximation. Because θN,far is small we can approximate
P (S ≤ t) ≈ φN,far
∫ t
−∞
F (s) ds.
The mean reward to ego for one item, as a function of φN,far, varies as
E(R(F (S)) −R(F (T ))1(S<T ) + constant.
Because U = F (T ) is uniform on (0, 1), in the N →∞ limit
E(R(F (S)) −R(F (T ))1(S<T ) = E(R(F (S)) −R(U))1(F (S)<U)
=
∫ 1
0
du E(R(F (S)) −R(u))1(F (S)<u)
=
∫ 1
0
du E
∫ u
min(F (S),u
r(y)dy
=
∫ 1
0
dy (1− y)r(y)P (F (S) ≤ y)
=
∫ 1
0
dy (1− y)r(y)P (S ≤ F−1(y))
= φN,far
∫ 1
0
dy (1− y)r(y)
∫ F−1(y)
−∞
F (s)ds.
The cost associated with using φN,far is cNφN,far, and at the Nash equilibrium the cost and reward
must balance, so at the Nash equilibrium F = FN,θN must satisfy
cN ∼
∫ 1
0
dy (1− y)r(y)
∫ F−1(y)
−∞
F (s)ds. (40)
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Now suppose instead that ego uses a different rate φN,near 6= θN,near for calling a neighbor. As
in section 3.2, we set λ = φN,near/θN,near so that we can use rate-1 nearest-neighbor first passage
pecolation as comparsion. For (τi) at (39) and independent Exponential(λ) random variables (ξ
λ
i )
write (as at (25))
Z(λ) := min
i
(τi + ξ
λ
i )−min
i
(τi + ξ
1
i ).
So Z(λ) is the time difference for ego receiving the information, caused by ego using φN,near
instead of θN,near. This time difference is measured after time-rescaling; in real time units the
time difference is Z(λ)/θN,near.
As above, write T for receipt time for ego using θN,near, and F = FN,θN for its distribution
function. Then receipt time for ego using φN,near is T + Z(λ)/θN,near, so ego’s rank becomes ≈
F (T )+F ′(T )Z(λ)/θN,near, and setting U = F (T ) the rank of ego is≈ U+F
′(F−1(U))Z(λ)/θN,near.
The associated mean reward change for ego is asymptotically
z(λ)
θN,near
×
∫ 1
0
r(u)F ′(F−1(u)) du; λ = φN,near/θN,near
where z(λ) = EZ(λ). Because the cost of using rate φN,near equals φN,near, the Nash equilibrium
condition (3) implies
θ2N,near ∼ z
′(1)
∫ 1
0
r(u)F ′(F−1(u)) du. (41)
We have now obtained the desired two equations for FN,θN at the Nash equilibrium θN . Use
(38) to rewrite these equations (40,41) in terms of F1 as
cN ∼ A
−1/3θ
−1/3
N,far θ
−2/3
N,near
∫ 1
0
dy (1− y)r(y)
∫ F−11 (y)
−∞
F1(s)ds
θ2N,near ∼ A
1/3θ
1/3
N,farθ
2/3
N,nearz
′(1)
∫ 1
0
r(u)F ′1(F
−1
1 (u)) du.
Solving for θN,near, θN,far we find
θN,near ∼ Q
1/2c
1/2
N , θN,far ∼ A
−1Q−1c−2N (42)
for
Q = z′(1)
(∫ 1
0
dy (1− y)r(y)
∫ F−11 (y)
−∞
F1(s)ds
)(∫ 1
0
r(u)F ′1(F
−1
1 (u)) du
)
.
7 Variants
7.1 Transitivity and the symmetric variant
The examples we have studied so far have a certain property called transitivity in graph theory
[3]. Informally, transitivity means “the network looks the same to each agent”; formally, it means
that for any two agents i, j there is an automorphism of the network that preserves the network
cost structure and maps i to j. This is what allows us to assume that in a Nash equilibrium each
agent uses same strategy.
The general framework of section 1.1 uses the asymmetric model in which agent i calls agent
j (at a certain cost to i) and learns all items that j knows. In the symmetric variant, agent i
calls agent j (at a certain cost to i), and each tells the other all items they know.
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For the transitive networks we have studied there is a simple relationship between the Nash
equilibrium values of the asymmetric and symmetric variants of the Poisson strategies:
θNashsym =
1
2θ
Nash
asy . (43)
The point is that the percolation process in the symmetric variant is just the percolation process
in the asymmetric variant, run at twice the speed, and this leads to the following relationship
between the reward when ego uses rate φ and other agents use rate θ:
rewardsym(φ, θ) = rewardasy(φ+ θ, 2θ).
Because payoff(φ, θ) = reward(φ, θ)− φ in each case, we get
payoff sym(φ, θ) = payoffasy(φ+ θ, 2θ) + θ
and therefore
d
dφ
payoff sym(φ, θ) =
d
dφ
payoffasy(φ+ θ, 2θ).
The criterion (3) leads to (43).
7.2 Communication at regular intervals
We have studied “Poisson rate θ” calling strategies because these are simplest to analyze explicitly.
A natural alternative is the “regular, rate θ” strategy in which agent i calls a random other agent
at times
Ui, Ui +
1
θ , Ui +
2
θ , . . . (44)
where Ui is uniform on (0,
1
θ ).
Consider first the complete graph case, and the setting (section 2.1) where (for fixed k ≥ 2)
the first k recipients get reward n/k. In this case, for k = 2 formula (8) is replaced by
P (ego is second to receive item) =
∫ min( 1
φ
, 1
θ
)
0
(1− θu)n−2 φ du
and repeating the analysis in section 2.1 gives exactly the same asymptotics (9,10) as in the
Poisson case. Consider instead the general reward framework
The j’th person to learn an item of information gets reward R( jn).
If all agents use rate θ then the distribution function Fθ for receipt time for a typical agent
satisfies (as an analog of the logistic equation (15))
1− Fθ(t) =
∫ t
t− 1
θ
∏
i≥0
(
1− Fθ(s−
i
θ )
)
θ ds. (45)
If ego switches to rate φ then the distribution function Gφ,θ for ego’s receipt time satisfies (as
an analog of (16))
1−Gφ,θ(t) =
∫ t
t− 1
φ
∏
i≥0
(
1− Fθ(s−
i
φ)
)
φ ds. (46)
One can now continue the section 2.4 analysis; we do not get useful explicit solutions but the
qualitative behavior is similar to the “Poisson calls” case, and in particular the Nash equilibrium
is wasteful.
Similarly, on the N ×N grid with nearest neighbor interaction, switching from the “Poisson
calls” case to the “regular calls” case preserves the order N−1 value of the Nash equilibrium rate
θNashN and hence preserves its efficiency.
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7.3 Gossip with reward based on audience size
Perhaps a more realistic model for gossip is to replace Rule 2 by
Rule 3. An agent i gets reward c whenever another agent learns an item from i.
For the complete graph and Poisson(θ) strategies we can re-use the section 2.4 analysis to calculate
the Nash equilibrium. First suppose all agents use the same rate θ and consider an agent i who
receives the information at percentile u. For j > un the j’th agent to receive the information
has chance 1j to receive it from agent i, and so the mean reward to agent i is (calculations in the
n→∞ limit) c
∫ 1
u
1
x dx = −c log(1− u). Suppose now ego switches to rate φ. Then (calls incur
unit cost)
payoff(φ, θ) = −φ+ cE(− log(1− Fθ(Tφ,θ)))
where the time Tφ,θ at which ego receives the information has distribution function Gφ,θ at (17),
and where Fθ at (14) is the distribution function of the time at which a typical agent receives the
information. Now
E(− log(1− Fθ(Tφ,θ))) =
∫ 1
0
1
1−uP (Fθ(Tφ,θ) ≤ u) du
=
∫ 1
0
1
1−u(1− (1− u))
φ/θ du by (18)
=
∫ 1
0
y−1(1− y)φ/θ dy
and then we calculate
d
dφ
payoff(φ, θ) = −1− c
∫ 1
0
log(1−y)
θ
(1−y)φ/θ
y dy.
Now the Nash equilibrium criterion (3) implies
θNashn → −c
∫ 1
0
1−y
y log(1− y) dy. (47)
So switching to this “Rule 3” model preserves the wastefulness of the Nash equilibrium on the
compete graph.
However, for the N × N grid with nearest neighbor interaction, switching to the “Rule 3”
models changes the efficient (θNashN is order N
−1) Nash equilibrium to a wasteful equilibrium with
θNashN becoming order 1.
7.4 Related literature
We do not know any literature closely related to our model. As well as the epidemic and the
gossip algorithm topics mentioned in the introduction, and classic applied probability work on
stochastic rumors [5], other loosely related work includes
• models where agents form networks under conditions where there are costs for maintaining
network edges and benefits from being part of a large network [7].
• Prisoners’ Dilemma games between neighboring agents on a graph [6].
One can add many other topics which are harder to model mathematically, e.g. diffusion of
technological innovations [12] or of ideologies.
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